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CONTRACTUAL FREEDOM,
CONTRACTUAL JUSTICE, AND
CONTRACT LAW (THEORY)
FLORIAN RÖDL*
I
INTRODUCTION
The current symposium, “The Public Dimension of Contract,” has been
gathered under the promising subheading of “legal theories in dialogue.” It thus
might be useful to begin with a few remarks about my general approach to the
“theory of private law,” which informs the questions and answers provided in
this article. The theoretical project to which the article is committed is neither
sociological, cultural, nor economic. It is philosophical. As a philosophical
project, its first aim is to understand, in the sense of hermeneutical
understanding. Generally speaking, such hermeneutical understanding has its
focus on concepts with which we are dealing every day in an unproblematic
1
way, but which become puzzling if we try to make them explicit. Time is the
famous example of such an apparently unproblematic concept; truth and justice
are others. Contract is a concept of the same sort. One eminent task of the
theory of private law is to illuminate this concept, to help us understand what a
contract is and why contract law is therefore the way it is. The focus of such a
project of illumination is certainly not on this or that particular contract rule or
2
on this or that area of contracting; its focus is on the basic structure of contract.
In short, this article is directed at better understanding the basic structure of
contract law.
Of course, there are not only other projects in private law theory—for
example sociological, cultural, and economics projects—but also alternative
3
philosophical projects, most notably projects of critique or deconstruction.
However, these projects presuppose an understanding of what is submitted to
Copyright © 2013 by Florian Rödl.
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1. See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 46–47 (P.M.S. Hacker &
Joachim Schulte eds. & trans., 4th ed. 2009). For the particular case of jurisprudence, see Michael
Oakeshott, The Concept of a Philosophical Jurisprudence, 3 POLITICA 203, 346 (1938).
2. Or “form,” as Ernest Weinrib says. See ERNEST WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 25
(1995).
3. For critical projects, see EVGENY B. PASHUKANIS, THE GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND
MARXISM (Barbara Einhorn trans., 2001) and MAX HORKHEIMER & THEODOR W. ADORNO,
DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT (Edmund Jephcott trans., 2007). For deconstructive projects, see
Jacques Derrida, Force de Loi: “Fondement Mystique de l’Autorité,” 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 920 (1990).
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critique or deconstruction. Any philosophical theory, including critical or
deconstructivist theories, must start (and actually does, though sometimes
implicitly) first and foremost with an understanding of contract law—with an
idea of what a contract is and why contract law is therefore the way it is.
It might be helpful to present a contrasting example to the philosophical
approach taken here. Law and economics provides such an example. Law and
economics scholars usually seem to claim that they are able to explain the basic
4
structure of private law in general and of contract law in particular. One
eminent puzzle for contract law theory in general is why contract law, all over
the world, usually gives expectation remedies—either specific performance or
expectation damages—instead of reliance damages in case of breach of
5
contract. Hence a theory which claims to illuminate basic features of contract
law must solve this puzzle.
The law and economics approach is well known for its “efficient breach” of
6
contract theory. The theory says that remedies for breach of contract must be
designed in a way to make sure that contracts are only breached if breach is
efficient. And this is meant to explain the award of expectation damages, as
reliance damages would allow for inefficient breach. Only expectation damages
secure that the promisor will breach only for a better bargain, that is, to vend an
item for a higher price. Only a better bargain makes the promisor still better off,
even though he pays expectation damages to the promisee. The award of
reliance damages, in contrast, would invite breach for bargains which are not
better but worse, in particular in the case of a promise not relied upon. The
problem with this account is that it is over-inclusive. The account based on
“efficient breach” is over-inclusive because it explains too much. Let us take it
for granted that it would explain expectation remedies. But the same argument
would hold that conversion should be treated just the same way as breach of
7
contract. If the original promisor happens to find a better bargain, but after the
execution of the contract including transfer of property, he may convert and
keep the surplus from the better bargain, if he repays the original purchasing
price. The problem is, however, that the law does not comply. In the case of
breach, the breaching party is allowed to keep the gain that exceeds expectation
damages; in conversion, the converting party has to confer the whole bargain to
the former proprietor.
If law and economics cannot explain this difference, it has not explained
expectation remedies. And given that law and economics is unable to explain
expectation damages, it is doubtful that it will be able to provide insight into
4. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L. REV.
281 (1979); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of
Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261 (1980).
5. L. L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J.
52, 57–66 (1936).
6. For an authoritative statement, see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 151
(8th ed. 2011).
7. See Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4–6 (1989).
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any other element of the basic structure of contract law. Therefore, for the
purpose of a theory of private law as a hermeneutical enterprise, law and
economics is not a very promising candidate.
Against this methodological background, it is the aim of this article to
illuminate, in the sense just described, the relation between contractual freedom
and contractual justice. The claim is, in a nutshell, that contract law requires
that contractual freedom be exercised in line with the rule of contractual justice.
Conceptual restriction of contractual freedom was and still is also the aim of
other approaches to contract law, which may be labelled “social” or “mixed.”
Section II will briefly explain why these approaches fail as hermeneutical
projects. Section III, then, will show that contract law does not confer boundless
freedom to enter into any contract. Instead, each and every contract is, by law,
subject to the rule of contractual justice, which includes the idea of a fair price.
Usually, scholars are puzzled to hear about the idea of a fair price and wonder
how it can be determined. For this reason, section IV explains why the law
takes the competitive market price to be fair: it is an instance of common usage
that is also more generally a source to determine what is required by
contractual justice.
II
LIBERAL, SOCIAL, AND MIXED UNDERSTANDINGS OF CONTRACT LAW
The social approach to understanding contract law was motivated by the
ever-growing body of contract rules that placed limits on the freedom of
8
contracting, mostly to prevent a stronger party from exploiting a weaker party.
From the social approach’s perspective, the traditional liberal approach had
proved incapable of coping conceptually with these developments. It had
proven incapable of integrating them into its illumination of the basic structure
of contract law. The liberal approach combines individual autonomy and
corrective justice as the two general principles of contract law which illuminate
its structure and its basic rules. The eminent example is still Charles Fried’s
9
10
Contract as Promise from 1981. To characterize the idea in a nutshell,
contracting means exercising one’s freedom, and the law, generally made to
enable and to protect human freedom, makes such exercises effective. That is
why contractual autonomy is at the core of this understanding of contract law.
Moreover, if contracts are concluded, legal consequences of delayed
performance, mal-performance, or nonperformance are governed by the
principle of corrective justice. This means, generally speaking, a party who

8. See FRANZ WIEACKER, PRIVATRECHTSGESCHICHTE DER NEUZEIT UNTER BESONDERER
BERÜCKSICHTIGUNG DER DEUTSCHEN ENTWICKLUNG 539–43 (2d ed. 1967). For a detailed account in
German law, see Claus-Wilhelm Canaris, Wandlungen des Schuldvertragsrechts—Tendenzen zu seiner
“Materialisierung,” 200 ARCHIV FÜR DIE CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS 273 (2000). See also PATRICK S.
ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 729–64 (1979).
9. See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981).
10. See id. at 7–13.
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wrongs the other party has to compensate the loss resulting from the wrong.
This general principle is, of course, elaborated in a manifold of rules for
different types of contracts and different types of wrongs.
Originally, scholars attempted to articulate the counter position of the social
justice approach as a full alternative. The most prominent attempt was made by
11
Anthony Kronman in 1980. He argued that contract law is one viable tool to
achieve distributive justice, just as tax law is. However, Kronman’s attempt
failed very early in the logic of his argument, mainly because he did not manage
12
to articulate an idea of distributive justice at all. Instead, Kronman’s yardstick
is wealth, though not in the sense of general welfare, but in the sense of each
13
and every individual’s wealth. In the upshot, Kronman’s shortcomings are
14
similar to those of law and economics.
Today, the social justice approach presents itself usually not as a full
15
alternative, but as a complementary correction of the liberal approach.
Although it is accepted as indispensable for some features of contract law, the
liberal approach, with its two principles, is considered too narrow to cover all
relevant parts of contract law. It is also criticized as too narrow from a
normative point of view, as it is interested only in the formal freedom of
property owners and contractors, not in the substantive freedom of human
beings, which depends in large part on notions of distributive justice in judicial
holdings.
The social approach today thus leads to a picture where contract law rules
cannot be illuminated from a single perspective, either liberal or social. Instead,
contract law rules can only be understood as emanating from a concurring
influence of both approaches. It is a version of a mixed approach to contract
law. Most contract law theorists today subscribe to some version of a mixed
16
approach.
Usually, mixed approaches claim that most rules of contract law are to be
understood as being derived from concurring and logically independent
principles. However, it seems very much unlikely that the law-generative
11. See Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472 (1980). For
a recent defense, see Daphne Lewinsohn-Zamir, In Defense of Redistribution Through Private Law, 91
MINN. L. REV. 326 (2006).
12. The argument is from Tugendhat and was directed to Rawls. See ERNST TUGENDHAT,
VORLESUNGEN ÜBER ETHIK 385 (1993).
13. See Kronman, supra note 12, at 481–91.
14. For a detailed criticism, see Peter Benson, Abstract Right and the Possibility of a
Nondistributive Conception of Contract: Hegel and Contemporary Contract Theory, 10 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1077, 1119–47 (1989).
15. Thomas Wilhelmsson, Questions for a Critical Contract Law—And a Contradictory Answer:
Contract as Social Cooperation, in PERSPECTIVES OF CRITICAL CONTRACT LAW 9, 30–34 (Thomas
Wilhelmsson ed., 1993); BRIGITTA LURGER, GRUNDFRAGEN DER VEREINHEITLICHUNG DES
VERTRAGSRECHTS IN DER EUROPÄISCHEN UNION 457–69 (2002).
16. Eminent examples are Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of
Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489 (1989); Melvin Eisenberg, The Theory of Contracts, in THE THEORY
OF CONTRACT LAW 206 (Peter Benson ed., 2001); and WILLIAM LUCY, PHILOSOPHY OF PRIVATE
LAW (2007).
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cooperation of different principles can be depicted other than by invoking an
17
idea of juridical balancing, or, in the language of Critical Legal Studies, an idea
18
of contestation. If it is indeed true, as is supposed here, that there is functional
equivalence of balancing and contestation, then a mixed approach cannot be a
viable version of, but rather an alternative to, the enterprise of understanding
the basic structure of contract law. It is the alternative to which we must indeed
turn if—but only if—the attempt to understand the basic structure of contract
law definitely fails.
As discussed above, one motive for the elaboration of the social (and
mixed) approach was and still is the ever-growing body of restrictions on
contractual freedom, made for the most part in order to protect a weaker party
from unfair contracts. Therefore, if an attempt at understanding is to avoid the
idea of balancing and contestation, it must reconcile the idea of contractual
freedom and contractual justice in a way that, on the one hand, represents a
coherent understanding of the basic structure of contract law and, on the other
hand, illuminates contract law in its modern version.
III
CONTRACTUAL JUSTICE AND CONTRACTUAL FREEDOM
A. Three Options
There are three conceptual ways to reconcile contractual freedom and
19
20
justice. The first option, which has been the view of Werner Flume, a German
scholar of highest authority in private law, can be called the procedural
understanding of contractual freedom. According to the procedural
understanding, the concept of fairness does not apply to the substance of a
contract. It can only apply to the procedure of contracting. Whatever the
outcome of a fair procedure of contract formation, we will not be able to judge
21
the contract upon the substantive fairness of its terms. The fair procedure of
contract formation is then represented as contractual freedom, that is, the
freedom to choose the other party, the subject matter, the consideration due,
and the other terms of a contract. As a procedural principle of justice in

17. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 16, 243–44. For the alternative attempt of a “ranking” of
values, see LUCY, supra note 16, at 382–87, 401–03.
18. See generally DUNCAN KENNEDY, A Left Phenomenological Alternative to the Hart/Kelsen
Theory of Legal Interpretation, in LEGAL REASONING: COLLECTED ESSAYS 153 (Gianni Vattimo &
Santiago Zabala eds., 2008); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96
HARV. L. REV. 561, 625–33 (1983).
19. See Hugh Collins, Distributive Justice Through Contracts, 45 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 49, 58–
63 (1992).
20. See WERNER FLUME, ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES BÜRGERLICHEN RECHTS: ZWEITER BAND:
DAS RECHTSGESCHÄFT (4th ed. 1992).
21. Id. at 8; see also Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. &
ECON. 293 (1975) (taking a similar position as Flume).
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contract formation, contractual freedom includes not only voluntariness of each
22
party’s consent, but also, arguably, equal bargaining power.
The second option might be called the instrumental understanding of
contractual freedom. According to this view, which is held by Karl Larenz, a
German scholar of similar high standing as Flume, contractual freedom is an
23
exceptionally reliable tool for reaching fair terms in contractual exchange.
Also in this version, contractual freedom includes the idea of equal bargaining
24
power. In contrast to the procedural understanding, the instrumental
understanding does not deny the conceptual possibility that the substance of a
contract can be judged with regard to its fairness. However, the law refrains
from correcting the substantive unfairness of a contract if the favorable
procedural conditions—that is, contractual freedom including equal bargaining
25
power—are met.
The alternative to both of these options is that contractual freedom only
allows for the conclusion of fair contracts. Contractual freedom does not cover
unfair contracts. There is no tension between the two concepts of contractual
freedom and contractual justice because contractual freedom can only be
exercised in voluntary agreements with fair terms. Unfair contracts cannot be
claimed valid by appealing to contractual freedom.
26
This alternative has been developed by James Gordley on Aristotelian
27
grounds and by Peter Benson on Hegelian grounds. However, their
philosophical arguments will not be explored here. Instead this article will ask
which of the three conceptual options best reflects the law of contracts. The
argument presented here will be developed with reference to German
jurisdiction, while complementary references to the common law will be given
in the annotations.
B. Contractual Justice in Contract Law
First, the rule of contractual justice regarding auxiliary terms will be
discussed, followed by its role regarding the more difficult issue of the just price.
Terminologically, however, it should be noted at this point that, in what follows,
“fairness” is taken to express nothing different from “justice.”

22. FLUME, supra note 20, at 10. Epstein, however, rejects this defense. See Epstein, supra note 21,
at 297.
23. See KARL LARENZ, LEHRBUCH DES SCHULDRECHTS: BAND I: ALLGEMEINER TEIL 76–79
(1987). The same position is reported by Stephen A. Smith, In Defence of Substantive Fairness, 112
L.Q. REV. 138, 156 (1996). Though not fully explicit, Spencer Thal seems to adopt a similar view. See
Spencer Nathan Thal, The Inequality of Bargaining Power Doctrine: The Problem of Defining
Contractual Unfairness, 8 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 17 (1988).
24. LARENZ, supra note 23, at 78; KARL LARENZ, ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES DEUTSCHEN
BÜRGERLICHEN RECHTS 46 (7th ed. 1989).
25. LARENZ, supra note 23, at 79; LARENZ, supra note 24, at 46.
26. See James Gordley, Equality in Exchange, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1587 (1981).
27. See Peter Benson, The Unity of Contract Law, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW 118 (Peter
Benson ed., 2001).
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1. Auxiliary Terms
What, then, is the conceptual relation between the fairness of auxiliary
terms and contractual freedom as it is represented by the law?
Two cases must be differentiated. The first case is the filling of gaps in
contracts. The aspect of gap filling refers to the situation where the parties have
agreed on some issues, including the main performance, but have not dealt with
problems that may occur during performance, for example, delayed
performance, impossibility, or other ways of breach. As we all know, contract
law provides default rules to fill in the gaps that have been left by the parties’
28
agreement. This is true no matter if the parties are of equal bargaining power.
Default rules apply if the parties have not agreed on relevant rules. They are
29
articulated by the courts or by the legislature. The question with regard to
contractual fairness and contractual freedom is, then, as follows: How are these
default rules to be understood? More precisely, what is the normative idea that
guides the articulation of default rules?
There is one old answer that tried to link the operation of setting default
rules with contractual freedom. Savigny suggested that the court or the
legislature try to determine a hypothetical agreement on the respective issues by
30
the contracting parties. The problem is that this answer does not actually help
to reveal what is guiding the making of default rules because one does not know
what the parties would have agreed on ex post, and the parties’ views on the
matter will diverge. Nor does it help to refer to what reasonable and honest
31
parties would agree on if they were acting in place of the actual parties. What
do the rules to which reasonable and honest parties would typically agree
actually look like? To get some guidance out of the formula, one has to push it
further: rules to be hypothetically agreed upon by reasonable and honest parties
must achieve a fair balance of the typical interests involved. This is a much
better answer. A shorter version reads: default rules provide for fair terms of
32
contract. Of course, it is not wrong to suggest that reasonable and honest
parties would hypothetically agree to fair terms of contract. But it is wrong to
think that this additional comment would help to determine the content of the

28. See KARL LARENZ & MANFRED WOLF, ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES BÜRGERLICHEN RECHTS
69 (9th ed. 2004); see also Craswell, supra note 16.
29. In the terminology of the German system, legislative rules are “dispositives Gesetzesrecht,” and
the courts’ rules are generated by “ergänzende Vertragsauslegung.” The function is the same.
30. FRIEDRICH CARL V. SAVIGNY, SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN RÖMISCHEN RECHTS: ERSTER BAND
57–58 (1840); see also BERNHARD WINDSCHEID & THEODOR KIPP, LEHRBUCH DES
PANDEKTENRECHTS 450 (Theodor Kipp ed., 9th ed. 1906). The locus classicus in common law is Globe
Ref. Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540 (1903). See also Todd D. Rakoff, The Implied Terms of
Contracts: Of ‘Default Rules’ and ‘Situation Sense,’ in GOOD FAITH AND FAULT IN CONTRACT LAW
191, 192 (Jack Beatson & Daniel Friedmann eds., 1997).
31. See LARENZ, supra note 23, at 79.
32. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 cmt. d (1981) (“But where there is in
fact no agreement, the court should supply a term which comports with community standards of
fairness and policy rather than analyze a hypothetical model of the bargaining process.”).
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33

fair terms. As a matter of fact, it does not contribute anything to the
understanding of what courts or legislators try to achieve in setting default
rules, besides perhaps emphasizing that the idea of fairness in question is
exclusively focused on the bipolar relationship between the two parties to the
contract.
It is important to repeat that default rules apply also to gaps that have been
left in contracts by parties of equal bargaining power. This implies that the law
presupposes and applies the idea of fairness to contracts concluded among
equals. This is exactly what the procedural understanding of contractual
34
freedom must deny as being conceptually impossible. It can therefore be
noted, already at this point, that the procedural understanding of contractual
justice does not reflect the law regarding auxiliary terms.
The second case to be differentiated is one where no question arises
between the parties due to a gap in the contract, but nevertheless a dispute
arises about the contractual rights and obligations. If the instrumental
understanding of contractual freedom were true and the law placed full
confidence in contractual freedom to generate fair terms when that freedom is
exercised between equals, then the law should enforce completed contracts
among equals as they stand. But this is not the case. The law does submit the
35
terms of contract to the standard of substantive fairness. In German law, the
idea of substantive fairness is represented in section 242 of the Bürgerliches
36
Gesetzbuch (BGB). The terminology is slightly different—the rule says “Treu
37
und Glauben” instead of substantive fairness—but this makes no difference in
substance. BGB section 242 submits each and every contract to a substantive
control of the fairness of its auxiliary terms. The common will of the parties, as
given under the objective test, is corrected if the content is found to be unfair.
This applies also to cases where the parties are of equal bargaining power.

33. In the same vein, see LORENZ KÄHLER, BEGRIFF UND RECHTFERTIGUNG ABDINGBAREN
RECHTS 116 (2012). The opposite view is held by Larenz’s academic follower Claus-Wilhelm Canaris.
See Canaris, supra note 8, at 285.
34. In Flume’s account, default rules are a result of completive interpretation (ergänzende
Auslegung), a way of interpretation that is, he emphasizes, “normative.” See FLUME, supra note 20, at
321–23. But he does not explain the guiding idea for this normativity.
35. For an overview in English, see Reinhard Zimmermann & Simon Whittaker, Good Faith in
European Contract Law: Surveying the Legal Landscape, in GOOD FAITH IN EUROPEAN CONTRACT
LAW 7, 18. (Reinhard Zimmermann & Simon Whittaker eds., 2000) and Werner F. Ebke & Bettina M.
Steinhauer, The Doctrine of Good Faith in German Contract Law, in GOOD FAITH AND FAULT IN
CONTRACT LAW 171–90 (Jack Beatson & Daniel Friedmann eds., 1995). The concept of good faith, as
expressed in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981), seems narrower, because its focus
is on performance and enforcement of a contract. However, similar results are reached by other
complementary doctrines. See Robert S. Summers, The Conceptualisation of Good Faith in American
Contract Law: A General Account, in GOOD FAITH IN EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 118 (Reinhard
Zimmermann & Simon Whittaker eds., 2000).
36. BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], Aug. 18, 1896, BUNDESGESETZBLATT
[BGBL.] 134, § 242 (Ger.).
37. “Good faith” in English.
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Of course, such a statement about the functioning of BGB section 242 is
only rarely found in the German literature. This literature is, instead,
38
preoccupied with grouping apparently singular cases, hardly without taking
them for instantiations of the general rule of contractual justice or fairness.
However, this is the idea that indeed unites the singular cases as applications of
the requirement of “Treu und Glauben.” Why, for example, although not
specified in the contract, does delivery at three o’clock in the morning not count
as contractual performance? The reason is that it would not be fair.
Certainly, one could contend that this line of argument might prove that all
cases subject to correction under BGB section 242 are united under the idea of
contractual fairness, but that it does not prove that all cases of contractual
unfairness are covered by BGB section 242. But this contention implies that it
would be possible to articulate a dividing line between cases of contractual
unfairness that are subject to BGB section 242 and cases that are not subject to
it. This articulation would then represent the actual uniting idea of BGB section
242. But such a dividing line does not exist. In consequence, to claim that not all
cases of contractual injustice are subject to BGB section 242 is unfounded. This
remains true even if such a claim could be proven to reflect the practice of the
courts.
As a result, it can be stated that, indeed, each and every term of contract is,
via the requirement of good faith (or similar doctrines), submitted to the rule of
contractual justice. This is true also among parties with equal bargaining
powers. Hence, the law does not actually place full confidence in the contractual
deliberations between equal partners to generate fair terms. It must be
concluded, thus, that the instrumental understanding of contractual freedom
does not reflect the law either, at least with regard to auxiliary terms.
The alternative, saying that contractual freedom only allows the concluding
of fair contracts, is fully coherent with the law as it stands: in cases of
uncompleted contracts, the law helps with providing fair terms; in the case of
completed contracts regarding a certain dispute between the parties, the law
corrects unfair terms.
2. Fair Price
Turning to the issue of a fair price, the question is, again, which of the three
conceptual options to understand the conceptual relation of contractual
freedom and contractual fairness best reflects the law as it is.
The shortcoming of the procedural understanding, which denies a
conceptual applicability of fairness to the agreement on the price, is rather
obvious. Contract law actually presupposes an idea of fair price. It is present not
39
in the doctrine of consideration, but in a separate doctrine in general contract

38. For representative literature, see STAUDINGER, KOMMENTAR ZUM BÜRGERLICHEN
GESETZBUCH § 242, ¶¶ 211–320, 403–1187 (2009).
39. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 79 (1981).
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40

law—the doctrine of unconscionability. BGB section 138, paragraph two says
that “a legal transaction is void by which a person, by exploiting the
predicament, inexperience, lack of sound judgement or considerable weakness
of will of another, causes himself or a third party, in exchange for an act of
performance, to be promised or granted pecuniary advantages which are clearly
41
disproportionate to the performance.” Hence, for each and every contract, the
provision asks whether promise and consideration are clearly disproportionate.
Given that the regular form of consideration is money, a disproportionate
consideration is nothing different from an unfair price. Hence, the conceptual
applicability of the doctrine is not restricted to contracts concluded by unequal
42
parties. From this we must infer that the law represents the concept of a fair
price as applicable to each and every contract, including contracts among
equals. We must, therefore, note that the procedural understanding that denies
even such conceptual application does not reflect the law, not only with regard
to auxiliary terms but with regard to the price as well.
But what about the instrumental understanding of contractual freedom:
does it not reflect unconscionability? As can be inferred from BGB section 138,
paragraph two, an unfair price will induce correcting effects by the law only if
further conditions are met (and to ease the presentation, they can be lumped
together in the general concept of unequal bargaining power). According to the
view committed to the instrumentalist understanding of contractual freedom,
equal bargaining power is the precondition to the functioning of contractual
43
freedom with regard to the fairness of exchange. Hence, if the procedural
condition is not met, fairness must be imposed on the parties. But if the
procedural condition is met, then the law, although it might find a price unfair,
refrains from imposing a fair price. This view seems perfectly in line with the
doctrine of unconscionability as expressed in BGB section 138, paragraph two,
as, under that section, the law indeed judges the fairness of the price, but
refrains from correction, if bargaining power is equal.
The problem with this view is that, although it seems to reflect exactly the
operation of the law, it has difficulties selling this operation as coherent. The
puzzling consequence of this view is that the law enforces a contract even
though it is aware that it is unfair. And it does so only because the procedural
condition of equal bargaining power is met. To explain such operation,
contractual freedom, if exercised among equals, has to be given additional
significance. The significance must come from something other than its
instrumental role in contractual fairness. General observations regarding what
40. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 208 (1981).
41. BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], Aug. 18, 1896, BUNDESGESETZBLATT
[BGBL.] 134, § 138, para. 2 (Ger.).
42. For an elaboration of the argument, see Smith, supra note 23, at 142–44. See also JAMES
GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW: PROPERTY, TORT, CONTRACT, UNJUST ENRICHMENT
366 (2007).
43. For a representative statement, see CLAUS-WILHELM CANARIS, DIE BEDEUTUNG DER
IUSTITIA DISTRIBUTIVA IM DEUTSCHEN VERTRAGSRECHT 51 (1997).
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contractual freedom amounts to—efficiency or individual autonomy (or any
other policy)—will not suffice at this point because the explanatory task is
exactly this: Why should the law accept an unfair price among equals? If it
accepts unfair prices among equals to support efficiency or autonomy (or any
other policy), then why does this (or any other) policy not also trump in the
case of unequal parties? If the answer is that such is a requirement of fairness,
then why does the requirement of fairness not play out among equals? In other
words, to restrict the law’s requirement of a fair price to the case of unequal
parties makes incomprehensible the reason why contractual fairness was
allowed to enter the conceptual stage at all. The instrumental understanding’s
answer to the problem of the fair price, which restricts the application of the
concept to cases of unequal parties, undermines its own premise that there is
conceptual room for the idea of fairness also regarding the price.
A similar conceptual dilemma arises in view of the different treatment of
price and terms: unfair terms among equals are to be corrected, but an unfair
price is not. Why should the law, among equals, accept an unfair price but not
unfair terms? Whatever reason is given to support acceptance of an unfair
price—efficiency, autonomy, and so on—could also apply to unfair terms. This
is even truer, given that terms and price are complementary, in the sense that a
price that is higher or lower than the fair price may allow for terms that are
more unfavorable than fair terms.
Of course, this kind of conceptual dilemma can be solved by invoking the
framework of conflicting considerations, values, or interests—efficiency and
freedom on the one hand, fairness on the other—that need balancing. And this
balancing might come out this or that way at this or that point in the doctrine of
contract law. However, as was stated in the introduction of this article, such a
solution is not valuable in a project of understanding contract law because it
represents abandoning understanding.
The alternative that proposes a harmonious unity of contractual freedom
and contractual fairness is in a much better position. According to the
alternative, the additional condition of equal bargaining power in cases of
unconscionability will help to sort out whether the relevant contract is indeed a
44
full contract of exchange or whether it is in parts a contract of gift. The gift
part is the part of, for example, an amount of money given for consideration
that exceeds the fair price. “Collector’s price” and “special price for a friend”
are the eminent examples. It is inferred from the absence of impaired
bargaining power that the amount exceeding the fair price is a gift. Admittedly,
German law is not fully in line with this argument. The sum that exceeds the fair
price is usually not treated as a gift, as this would require further conditions to
45
be binding before performance. Instead, the exceeding sum is treated as an
44. The argument that the law’s distinction between contract and gift requires the idea of equal
value has been developed by Peter Benson. See Benson, supra note 27.
45. BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], Aug. 18, 1896, BUNDESGESETZBLATT
[BGBL.] 740, § 518, para. 1 (Ger.).
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inseparable part of the contract. But in contrast to the shortcomings of the two
other conceptions discussed, this seems a misfit of only minor importance. In
the upshot, it turns out to be true that the law submits each and every contract
of exchange to the standard of a fair price.
As an intermediate conclusion, it can be stated that, firstly, the procedural
understanding of contractual freedom is not able to reflect any relevant aspect
of contract law. Secondly, the instrumentalist procedural understanding does
only slightly better. It does not reflect the law regarding fair terms. It seems to
fit for the fair price, but this apparent success leads it into a conceptual dilemma
in that it either loses the idea of justice or results in a position of nonunderstanding. The alternative proposal, in contrast, best reflects contract law,
and it does not raise further difficult conceptual questions. This is why the
alternative version seems worthy of being explored further.
IV
CONTRACTUAL FAIRNESS, COMMON USAGE, AND MARKET PRICE
This section will shed more light on the idea of contractual fairness,
including the idea of a fair price, namely, how the idea operates in contract law.
In order to articulate the requirements of contractual fairness, German law
sometimes, on relevant points, refers to common usage (Verkehrssitte). In
46
German contract law, this is the case in BGB sections 157 and 242. To
determine what is required by “Treu und Glauben” the law resorts to common
usage. Why is this?
Common usage represents what parties typically agree on. The similarity to
the standard answer to the question of how default rules are to be determined is
evident. But it is an empirical standard, not a normative one. This
notwithstanding, common usage serves to articulate default rules more precisely
or to fill in gaps which are left by default rules; these two purposes are
functionally equivalent. For a court, common usage is a way to find out what
terms would be fair, instead of determining them by its own judgment.
Common usage is one of the law’s sources of knowledge about contractual
47
fairness. But why does the law view common usage as a reliable source?
48
This is the point where deliberative theory must be introduced. Common
usage is the result of a multiplicity of transactions. In each transaction, the
parties argue about fair terms. Either they deliberate and give reasons why this
or that term is fair or unfair, or they do not deliberate but decline to agree
unless one party offers terms which are considered fair by the other. When will
deliberation lead to fair results? Deliberative theory claims that this requires an
49
ideal speech situation. Though the argument would require further
46. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 219–22 (1981).
47. See PAUL OERTMANN, RECHTSORDNUNG UND VERKEHRSSITTE 369–86 (1914).
48. For a deliberative theory of contract, see Bertram Lomfeld, Contract as Deliberation, 76 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2013 at 1.
49. See Jürgen Habermas, Wahrheitstheorien (1972), in VORSTUDIEN UND ERGÄNZUNGEN ZUR
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elaboration, for which this paper leaves no space, it is suggested that the ideal
speech situation for determining fair terms of contractual exchange is the
condition where the parties have equal bargaining power, which is the case in
an ordinary competitive market. So it is assumed, in the upshot, that in a
competitive market parties will usually agree on fair terms. This is why the law
can legitimately refer to common usage to determine what terms would be fair.
It is important to note the difference between the law’s deferral to common
usage and the instrumentalist procedural understanding of contractual freedom.
The latter accepts each and every result agreed on by parties with equal
bargaining power. In contrast to this, common usage refers not to the single
case, but to the usual case. This implies that parties, in a single case, may err
about the fairness of terms and will be corrected by the law, even though they
were in a good position to generate fair terms due to their equal bargaining
power. The usual case is the normative standard for the single case.
This understanding of common usage can also help to explain why the fair
50
price is represented as the competitive market price. It was argued above that
common usage is one important source for the law’s knowledge about fair
terms. The next step seems evident: The market price is the usual price, the
price which results from common usage, from a multiplicity of deliberations
about the fair price. However, there is an explanatory gap. In the argument
above, it is presupposed that judges, legislators, and even private parties can
argue about the fairness of terms. One has an idea about the kind of arguments
that can be given in such deliberation. What kinds of arguments can be used to
discover the fair price? What argument could be made that a certain commodity
should be exchanged for x euros rather than for 2x euros?
Concurring approaches have suggested either that there is actually no
51
reasonable argument available, or that the argument is eventually based on
52
need, scarcity, and costs. The alternative answer is that parties’ deliberations
circle around the idea of the value of the good. And the conceptual framework
set up by the law presupposes that value functions as an objective standard.
Value is not established, but rather it is discovered by the contracting parties.
Imagine the case of a new commodity for which no market price exists yet. In
this case, the parties will determine the value by inquiring into the purchasing
power that it represents. The objective value of the commodity is represented
by the price that will be paid for it in a different transaction involving another
party (and so on). So even in the first transaction of a new commodity, the
parties try to anticipate the purchasing power that the good will command in
similar transactions. With this, the parties try to anticipate the market price.
And a given competitive market price is just the outcome of a multiplicity of
such anticipations; it is a multiplicity of judgments about the value of a
THEORIE DES KOMMUNIKATIVEN HANDELNS 127 (Jürgen Habermas ed., 1st ed. 1984).
50. For concurring approaches, see Benson, supra note 27, and Gordley, supra note 26.
51. See Benson, supra note 27, at 189.
52. See Gordley, supra note 26, at 1605.
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commodity. Given that a competitive market price exists, it represents common
usage. Common usage provides the relevant standard of contractual fairness
also with regard to the price. The competitive market price is an instantiation of
common usage.
V
CONCLUSION
The conclusion shall be restricted to three remarks on the functions served
by the hermeneutical view of contract law presented in this paper. First, it helps
to understand the basic structure of contract law. Second, it can help to
understand where case-by-case and ex post control of contractual fairness by
courts is not sufficient, and where instead general and ex ante guidance by the
legislature is needed. The eminent examples are the areas of essentially
distorted markets, as in the case of human labor, housing space, foodstuffs,
energy, loans of money, et cetera. The markets for these “fictitious
53
commodities” are essentially distorted in the sense that even competition law
cannot impose a competitive structure on them. Third, it helps us to reveal
where the basic structure of contract law cannot apply at all, as in the case of
surrogate parenting or organ transplantation.
A final word should be said explicitly to the “public dimension of contract,”
the subject of this symposium: Contract law realizes a basic structure of
morality. Liberals claim that this structure reflects and enables human freedom.
The argument above shows, in turn, that it reflects human equality, the equality
of human beings (and yet being human certainly implies being free). This
fundamental foundation in equality is the one and only “public dimension” of
contract law’s basic structure. At the very end, one puzzling question remains:
Why has this idea been so unattractive for authors who have tried to develop an
alternative to the liberal understanding of contract law?

53. The term and the theory of “fictitious commodities” were developed by Karl Polanyi in KARL
POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME
(1944).

